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The right time 
for insurance
How to get Kenyan farmers to protect 
against crop failure
Lorenzo Casaburi Assistant Professor of Development Economics, University of Zurich
Farming is risky: drought, flooding, pests,  
a bad harvest or a dip in crop prices can 
leave small farmers in developing countries 
without a steady income throughout the 
year. Attempts to mitigate these risks with 
agricultural insurance have typically been 
unsuccessful because farmers have chosen 
not to buy it (Cole and Xiong, 2017).
For decades, companies, aid organizations, 
and governments in developing countries 
have tried to increase the numbers of farmers 
who insure their crops. Yet demand for crop 
insurance has remained persistently low in 
spite of heavy subsidies, product innovation, 
and marketing campaigns.
In part, this low demand may be due to 
payment timing: most insurers offer insur-
ance (and require premium payments) at 
planting time, when farmers are typically 
cash-constrained due to purchases of seeds 
and other materials.
Another reason that farmers may not  
purchase insurance is impatience: they 
might care more about the cost of insur-
ance today than about the income they 
might lose due to a future crop failure.
Finally, farmers may not purchase insurance 
because they are not convinced that the in-
surer will actually pay them if their crops fail.
The right time for insurance
In a nutshell 
A bad harvest can have severe consequences for farmers, especially 
in developing countries. But despite the significant advantages  
of agricultural insurance as a way to alleviate this risk, only a small  
percentage of farmers insure their crops. This policy brief outlines a 
simple but effective solution identified and tested by development 
economists, which has increased the adoption of crop insurance to 
over 70% of sugarcane farmers in Kenya. The key lies in shifting  
the time at which payment of premiums is required: from before the 
crop is harvested to afterwards. 
Opportunities for action
1
Farmers are much more likely 
to buy crop insurance when 
payment of the premiums are 
delayed until after the harvest; 
demand increases most among 
the poorest farmers.
In detail
3
Given considerable evidence 
that poor people don’t buy 
other types of insurance,  
including health insurance, 
understanding how to improve 
the timing of premium payment 
for these products is an import-
ant policy question.
2
Key reasons why farmers may 
not buy insurance are that they 
are typically cash-constrained 
at planting time, and that they 
care more about the cost of 
insurance today than the poten-
tial protection from income 
losses from future crop failure.
2
Farmers are much more likely  
to purchase crop insurance 
when payments are delayed  
until after the harvest
We partnered with a large sugarcane compa-
ny in Kenya to run a ‘randomized controlled 
trial’, in which farmers were offered a  
different type of insurance product for 
which they can subscribe at planting time 
but only have to pay the premium at harvest 
time. This twist in the product design may 
address some of the reasons for low take-
up of insurance – and indeed we find that 
farmers are much more likely to purchase 
insurance when the payments are delayed 
until after the harvest. 
Textbook insurance
In the textbook model, insurance helps  
to transfer income across states of the 
world: from desirable states (such as a 
good harvest) to undesirable states (such  
as a bad harvest). In practice, however, 
most insurance products also transfer  
income across time: the premium is paid 
upfront with certainty, and any payouts 
are made in the future in the event of a  
bad state of the world.
As a result, the demand for insurance  
depends not just on risk aversion, but also 
on several additional factors, including:
• Liquidity constraints: do buyers have the 
money to pay the premium now?
• Intertemporal preferences: do buyers 
worry more about current costs than po-
tential future costs?
• Trust: do farmers believe that they will be 
paid in the event of a claim?
Since these factors can also make it harder 
to smooth consumption over time and 
hence to self-insure, charging the premium 
upfront may reduce demand for insurance 
precisely when the potential gains are larg-
est – for example, among the poor.  
Our study provides experimental evidence
on the consequences of the transfer across
time, common in insurance, by evaluating
a crop insurance product that eliminates it. 
Crop insurance offers large  
potential gains in developing 
countries, as farmers face  
risky incomes and have few 
savings to self-insure
Agriculture in Kenya 
In sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of  
the working population works in agricul-
ture, and small-scale farmers account for 
the vast majority of agricultural production. 
Sugarcane is one of the main cash crops  
in Kenya’s western region, where our  
evaluation took place.
Sugarcane farmers are typically poor.  
Nevertheless, sugarcane is a cash crop and 
thus these farmers are typically better  
off than those who grow crops merely for 
subsistence purposes. Crop production  
is subject to significant risks from rainfall, 
climate, pests, and fire. Very few farmers  
in the region have experience with formal 
insurance.
We partnered with a Kenyan sugar company, 
which uses a contract farming model to 
recruit farmers. In contract farming, a 
farmer signs an agreement to sell his crops 
to the company at harvest time and the 
buyer commits to purchase the crop.
At the start of planting season, companies 
typically offer farmers inputs such as seeds 
and fertilizer on credit, repayable in the 
future as a deduction from harvest revenue. 
This payment schedule can also be used for 
insurance: in the study setting, the sugar 
company could offer insurance at planting 
time with the premium payment deducted 
from harvest revenue.
The experimental intervention 
Crop insurance usually has to be paid at 
the beginning of the season, just when the 
3
farmers need money for inputs, seeds, and 
machinery, and to feed their family until 
harvest, when they can sell their produce. 
In partnership with the sugar company,  
we offered farmers crop insurance with the 
premium due after the harvest to evaluate 
whether later payment would increase 
demand for the insurance.
In our main experiment, we randomly 
assigned a sample of 605 sugarcane farm-
ers to one of three groups (see Figure 1A):
• Standard offer: Farmers were offered 
insurance at the market rate and had to 
pay the premium at planting time.
• Discounted standard offer: Farmers were 
offered insurance with a 30% discount at 
planting time.
• Harvest deduction offer: Farmers were 
offered insurance at the market rate, but 
the premium cost was deducted from their 
revenues at harvest time.
The sugar company offered identical insur-
ance products across all three groups. If  
an insured farmer’s plot and neighboring 
farmers’ plots produced substantially less 
than a historical benchmark, the sugar 
company would distribute a payout cover-
ing up to 20% of the farmer’s predicted 
revenues.
We complemented these offers with two 
smaller experiments to understand why 
delaying premium payments might increase 
demand for insurance. In our ‘cash drop’ 
experiment (see Figure 1B), we gave 120 
randomly selected farmers an amount of 
cash that was slightly more than the insur-
ance premium cost, ensuring that these 
farmers could purchase insurance if they 
wanted it. 
In our ‘intertemporal preferences’ experi-
ment (see Figure 1C), we offered another  
120 randomly selected farmers the choice 
between a cash grant equal to the insurance 
premium or free insurance. This enabled 
us to test whether demand to pay upfront is 
low because the premium must be paid 
immediately at sign-up and farmers put a 
very high weight on immediate costs –  
a kind of behavior known as ‘present bias’ 
(see Ericson and Laibson, 2019). A randomly 
assigned half of these farmers were told 
that they would receive their choice imme-
diately, while the other half were told that 
they would receive their choice in one 
month. If farmers did suffer from present 
bias, then delaying the choice could help 
overcome their tendencies to care more 
about income in the present than potential 
losses in the future.
Results 
Overall, we find that farmers are much more 
likely to purchase insurance when they do 
not have to make payments until after  
the harvest. We also find that demand for 
the standard insurance offer is likely to  
be low for three reasons: farmers may have 
limited cash to purchase insurance before 
the harvest; they may suffer from present 
bias; and they may not trust insurers to 
follow through on their payments if a crop 
failure occurs.
Only 5% of farmers who were offered  
standard insurance decided to purchase it.  
Offering a discount on stan dard insurance 
did not increase farmers’ demand for it. 
However, 72% of those offered the harvest 
deduction insurance purchased it (see Figure 
2). In addition, this increase in uptake is 
larger for poorer farmers, who may face 
more severe liquidity constraints.
Pay-at-harvest premiums  
increase demand for crop insur-
ance among sugarcane farmers 
in Kenya from 5% to 72%
Giving cash grants to farmers increases 
their purchases of the standard insurance, 
but to a much lesser extent than offering 
harvest deduction insurance (see Figure 3). 
When the payment is delayed by a month, 
4
Empirical evidence
Figure 1: 
Experimental design
Insurance premium:
Insurance premium:
Receive cash or insurance:
Cash drop:
Figure 1A: 
Main experiment
Figure 1B: 
Cash drop experiment
Figure 1C: Intertemporal 
preferences experiment
N=605
N=120
upfront
now
upfront
no noyes yes
at harvest
in one month
at harvest
upfront with 
30% discount
Notes: We randomly distributed 120 farmers equally across four treatment groups. The experimental 
design cross-cut two treatments: pay-upfront vs. pay-at-harvest insurance, as in the main experiment, and 
a cash drop version. At the beginning of individual meetings with farmers, those selected to receive cash 
were given an amount, which was slightly larger than the insurance premium. At the end of the meetings, 
farmers were offered the insurance product.
Notes: We randomly distributed 605 farmers equally across three treatment groups. All farmers were 
offered an insurance product; the only thing varied across treatment groups was the premium. In the first 
group, farmers were required to pay the (‘actuarially-fair’) premium upfront, as is standard in insurance 
contracts. In the second group, premium payment was again required upfront, but farmers received a 
30% discount relative to. In the third group, the full-priced premium would be deducted from farmers' 
revenues at (future) harvest time, including interest charged at the same rate used for the inputs the com-
pany supplies on credit (1% per month). 
Notes: We randomly distributed 120 farmers equally across two treatment groups. Farmers in both 
groups were offered a choice between either a cash payment – equal to the ‘full-priced’ insurance premium 
– or free enrollment in the insurance. Both groups had to make the choice during the meeting, but there 
was a difference in when it would be delivered. In the ‘Receive Choice Now’ group, farmers were told that 
they would receive their choice immediately. In the ‘Receive Choice in One Month’ group, farmers were 
told that they would receive their choice in one month’s time (the cash payment offered to farmers in this 
case included an additional month’s interest).
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Figure 3: 
Insurance take-up by treatment group
Figure 4: 
Decision-making and insurance take-up
Figure 2: 
Insurance take-up by treatment group
Insurance take-up (N=120)
Insurance take-up (N=121)
Insurance take-up (N=605)
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Notes: The figure shows insurance take- 
up rates across the four treatment groups 
in the Cash Drop experiment. In the  
‘Pay Upfront’ group, farmers had to pay 
the premium when signing up for the 
insurance. In the ‘Pay Upfront + Cash’ 
group, farmers were given a cash drop 
slightly larger than the cost of the premi-
um, and had to pay the premium at 
sign-up. In the ‘Pay At Harvest’ group,  
if farmers signed up for the insurance then 
the premium (including accrued interest  
at 1% per month) would be deducted 
from their revenues at (future) harvest 
time. In the ‘Pay At Harvest + Cash’ 
group, farmers were given a cash drop 
equal to the cost of the premium and 
premium payment was again through 
deduction from harvest revenues.
Notes: The figure shows insurance take- 
up rates across the three treatment groups 
in the main experiment. In the ‘Pay 
Upfront’ group, farmers had to pay the 
full-price premium when signing up to the 
insurance. In the ‘Pay Upfront + 30% 
Discount’ group, farmers also had to  
pay the premium at sign-up, but received 
a 30% price reduction. In the ‘Pay At 
Harvest’ group, if farmers signed up  
to the insurance, then the premium (in-
cluding accrued interest at 1% per month) 
would be deducted from their revenues 
at (future) harvest time.
Notes: The figure shows insurance take- 
up rates across the two treatment groups in 
the Intertemporal Preferences experiment. 
In the ‘Receive Now’ group, farmers chose 
between an amount of money equal to 
the premium and free subscription to the 
insurance, knowing that they would receive 
their choice straight away. In the ‘Receive 
in One Month’ group, farmers made the 
same choice, but knowing that they would 
receive whatever they chose one month 
later. 
Pay 
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Receive choice now Receive choice in 
one month
Pay 
upfront + 
cash
Pay at 
harvest
Pay at 
harvest + 
cash
M
ai
n 
ex
pe
rim
en
t
100%
100%
75%
75%
50%
50%
25%
25%
0%
0%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Pay upfront Pay upfront
with 30% 
discount
Pay at 
harvest
6%
33%
51%
71%
72%
5%
13%
76%
88%
6
farmers are more likely to choose insurance 
over cash, suggesting that they may suffer 
from present bias (see Figure 4).
Finally, because of financial problems, the 
sugar company had to delay harvesting for 
many farmers, inducing them to sell to other 
buyers. This shows the importance of trust: 
farmers must believe the insurer will pay the 
insurance. Delaying the premium payment 
until harvest time saves farmers the premium 
if the insurer defaults before harvest.
Conclusions
Taken together, these results suggest that 
farmers are more willing to purchase  
insurance when they are able to pay the 
premium after the harvest. There are  
two likely reasons that timing affects this  
decision: farmers have limited cash before 
the harvest; and they are more likely to 
care about the costs of the premium today 
than about the potential costs from a crop 
failure in the future.
Before the harvest, farmers  
care more about the costs of  
the premium today than about 
the potential costs of a future 
crop failure
The results show that farmers do have  
high demand for insurance, but they have  
a low willingness to pay for it upfront.  
An important implication is that the low 
demand for standard insurance found in 
previous research should not be considered 
as evidence that farmers do not value risk- 
management products. Rather, other con-
straints – such as liquidity constraints – 
prevent them from taking full advantage  
of these products.
Given this simple and effective solution  
for a big problem, why is the idea not yet 
used extensively in the industry? One  
possible explanation is that insurers take 
an extra risk by allowing farmers to delay 
the premium payment. There is the risk 
that farmers will default when the time 
comes to pay, so it is important to increase 
the likelihood that they will indeed pay 
when the time comes.
For our experiment, we used a collection 
method that relied on our contract farming 
setting: tying the insurance contract to 
a sales contract. It is important to test how 
to enforce premium payment at harvest  
in other settings. For example, methods
used in microfinance – such as relational 
contracting, group liability, and collateral – 
may be viable options.
This UBS Center Policy Brief summarizes ‘Time vs. State in Insurance: 
Experimental Evidence from Contract Farming in Kenya’ by Lorenzo 
Casaburi (University of Zurich) and Jack Willis (Columbia University), 
published in the American Economic Review 108(12): 3778-3813 in 
2018.
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